University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (ASC)

Annenberg School for Communication

January 2008

"All Under Heaven" -- Megaspace in Beijing
Carolyn Marvin
University of Pennsylvania, cmarvin@asc.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers

Recommended Citation (OVERRIDE)
Marvin, C. (2008). "All under heaven" -- Megaspace in Beijing. In M. E. Price & D. Dayan (Eds.), Owning the
Olympics (pp. 229-259). Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press and the University of Michigan
Library. Retrieved from http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/127

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/127
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

"All Under Heaven" -- Megaspace in Beijing
Abstract
Staging the 2008 Olympics is heady stuff for the modern descendants of the Middle Kingdom. Though its
emperor once possessed a divine mandate to rule "All Under Heaven," China's international role has been
far more circumscribed during the last century and a half. Now the Chinese believe their luck has
changed. Playing host to the largest of all modern peacetime extravaganzas perfectly suits the current
Chinese political imagination, succinctly if not subtly expressed in the Beijing Olympic Slogan, "One World,
One Dream." Through the magic of media, the 2008 Games will certainly reach all under heaven, a scale
the Chinese have embraced by sending an Olympic flag to orbit the earth for five days in 2005 aboard
China's second manned space mission, Shengzhou VI (Zhao 2005).
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"All Under Heaven"Megaspace in Beijing
Carolyn Marvin

Staging the 2008 Olympics is heady stuff for the modern descendants
of the Middl~ Kingdom. Though its emperor once possessed a divine
mandate to rule IIAll Under Heaven,'1 China's international role has
been far more circumscribed during the last century and a half. Now
the Chinese believe their luck has changed. Playing host to the largest
of all modern peacetime extravaganzas perfectly suits the .current Chinese political imagination, succinctly if not subtly.expressed in the Beijing Oiympic Slogan, "One World, One Dream." Through the magic of
media, the 2008 Games will certainly reach all under heaven, a scale
the Chinese have embraced by sending an Olympic flag to orbit the
earth for five days in 2005 aboard China's second manned space mis~
sion, Shengzhou VI (Zhao 2005).
The image of the world as Chinals sphere of influence could be seen
in talk about the Olympic torch relay, the most ambitious ever. The
"Journey of Harmony" would, according to Beijing Organizing Com~
mittee of the Olympic Games (BOCOG) head Liu Qi, be the most territorially extensive ever, crossing 85/000 miles and five continents, tracing the ancient Silk Road and ascending Mt. Everest (nailing down
China's claim to Tibet), before reaching the capital (Channel NewsAsia
2007). When state television broadcast "Rise of the Great Nations/II presenting the histories of nine world-dominating modern nations including the United States, the Netherlands, and England (Beijingmike
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there was· scant need for the series to name China as the coming
tenth to ascend to greatness for its domestic audience. Many citizens
are said to believe their leaders have a secret strategy that will make this
century China's. Meanwhile, visually lush programs about the history
of ancient China are endlessly recycled on the West~directed English~
language channel.
Architecture has long been at the heart of Chinese statecraft, so it is
no surprise that built form has a special role to play in the XXIX
Olympiad. The character of OlympiC public space is part of the effort to
change the subject from protests about China's human rights record,
its role in Darfur, its labor practices, and the lingering memory of the
1989 massacres of protesters in the streets near Tiananmen Square by
giving expression to "the firm belief of a great nation, with a long history of 5,000 years and on its way to modernization, that it is committed to peaceful development, harmonious society and people's happi~
ness," as the BOCOG Web site insists (BOCOG 2005). Always just
offstage, the past is a resource for reinventing not only the Maoist
legacy recent leaders have been at pains to go beyond, but less savory
elements of the current regime as well.
Taken as a whole, Olympic construction, emblematized in Olympic
Green and its venues, is the latest in a series of contemporary public
works projects including the Tibet-Qinghai railway (the world's highest) and the Three Gorges Dam (the world's largest) that form a stately
procession forward from the Great Wall, the Forbidden City, and
Tiananmen Square, all of which will greet Olympic visitors in newly re·
stored splendor. The massive coordination of people and resources that
produced each of these works in times past hints of a historically pre~
ordained sweep to the "harmonious society" invoked by Hu Jintao as a
national goal. As well, it deflects concern for the several millions who
have borne the brunt of OlympiC development directly, either as labor~
ers without rights or protection, or citizens who have lost homes and
livelihoods in this latest wave of urban redevelopment (Watts 2005).
The harmonious society also appeals to newly resurrected Confucian
values of respect for authority and stability. Maligned during the
Maoist era, this most venerable of Chinese political traditions has
reemerged as an invented tradition for legitimizing the considerable
domestic social burdens created by a rising China. l
According to the social theorist Henri Lefebvre every society pro~
duces its characteristic material spaces (r99r). Lefebvre posits a trialec~
tic of contending and contradictory forces that can go some way to

plumb the multiple material layers of the current Olympic drama,
fb.ough any such framework for such sociospatial complexity must be
suggestive at best. Lefebvre's first layer is the space conceived by rulers,
architects, planners, and bureaucrats. It expresses what Amos Rapoport
has called designers' values (r982). This officially authorized spatial
imagination of Beijing 2008 seeks to project, above all, the image of a
sophisticated modern country open to a world that will be enthusiastically receptive in its turn. For this purpose, Olympic planning and exe~
cution have been share~ out among the State Council, the Beijing Municipal Government, the Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee, the
Chinese Olympic Committee, the International Olympic Committee,
and a collaborating army of sponsors, developers, architects, and con~
struction crews. The same could not be said for many of the people
most directly affected by it. Still, Olympic goals occupy a prominent
place in the loth and nth Five-Year Plans and all supporting texts addressing the development of specific spaces and projects. These goals
are publicly articulated on BOCOG's Web site, which offers official
commentary on Olympic preparation and will be the authorized site
for the festival itself.
Lefebvre's second layer emerges as those whose lives unfold in the ef~
fort to bring "conceived" space to life struggle to shape it to their own
symbolic and material uses. Here are manifest all the desires and pas~
sions of users' values of reception, resistance, accommodation, and re·
Vision. Debates about the character of particular uses and structures,
struggles over building and implementation decisions, and responses to
their impact on urban life occur here. In Beijing such debates have generated new vocabularies and rhetorical resources for surrogate discussions about the political future of China itself. Concrete practices of
construction and use, the third layer of the Lefebvrian trialectic, tack
back and forth between officially "conceived" and'vernacularly "lived"
levels to produce actualized structures and spaces that in the present
case will contain the activities of athletes, officials, and luminaries, and
will anchor the large and animated crowds without which no Games
can be considered successful. The realized spaces and the communities
(including the crowds!) that are thus created will continue to modify
their new spaces when the Games are done. Briefly sketched, this is how
space for Lefebvre is the unending work of a whole society, an oeuvre.
Meanwhile, the Chinese have officially and informally embraced
the Games as a moment of national history. Newspaper coverage of the
bidding process riveted public attention while posters and slogans ap~
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peared everywhere in the run-up to the announcement of the 2008
Olympic host city. When word came, Beijingers pulled out the stops for
a dazzling "flag~waving, horn-honking, music-jamming, firecracker~ex
ploding" party. Millions of citizens have since been enthusiastic participants in Olympic preparation, though not everyone has been equally
swept up. There have also been protests, riots, and the occasional suicide. Organized resistance to the sharp elbows of planners has come
from improvised and shifting alliances of artists, intellectuals, and professionals. Whatever their views, all Beijingers have picked their way
through the dizzying pace of small and large changes and their aftershocks in the dramatic transformations under way.
The ongoing demolition of what remains of the old, often dilapidated republican city reflects the regime's desire to remove every obstacle to China's modernizing vision of itself andto make Beijing a contemporary showcase. The urban renewal of Beijing has been a project
of every regime since the collapse of the Qing dynasty. 2 The period of
post-1978 reforms has engendered especially great social strains. Citi~
zens have endured intense urbanization, growing inequalities between
the wealthy and ordinary workers, the displacement and impoverishment of agrarian peasants by industrialization, and massive environmental degradation. To contain the resulting pressures for accountability and democratization simmering just beneath the surface/there are
strong pressures to vindicate the post-Mao direction of Deng Xiaoping
and his market-oriented successors with an iconic Olympic success.
Since 1960 host cities have counted on the Games to jump start lagging urban economies (Hanwen and Pitts 2006; Owen 2005). Beijing's
economic miracle needs no' fanning. Government figures recorded
more than [2 percent growth in 2006 (Economist.com 2007a). By melding globalization, local needs, and cultural tradition the regime hopes
to transform Beijing from a major regional city to a full~fledged world
capital on a par with Singapore, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. That effort
stands behind the official presentation of the Games as a "Green, Hightech, Olympics for the People." Mindful of international anxiety about
the pace of China's development for resource competition and the environmental pollution (China produces 17 percent of global carbon
emissions, second only to the United States' 22 percent) (Economist.com
2007b), the "Green ll Olympics aims to present China as an ethically
and technologically responsible environmental steward. The "Hightech/! Olympics .will promote a China po.ssessed C?f first-world commu-

nications, transportation, and building technologies. For the "People'sll
Olympics, China hopes to demonstrate a level of domestic and ethnic
enthusiasm that will impress visitors and its own populace. To accomplish all this, the Chinese claim to be ~pending in the range of $30 to
$40 billion, up from $14 billion for Sydney, the previous record (Eeanamist.com 2oo7a).

Olympic Challenges
For a country whose economy is not as large or sturdy as those of first.
tier industrial nations, this is a high stakes, risky undertaking. Olympic
deadlines, however, are certain. For a month ,in 2008 a city of IS million permanent residents and 4 million from elsewhere in the country
will receive more than 2.5 million visitors, among them some 17,600
athletes and officials and at least as many members of the press. For the
Games to succeed! Beijingers know that this influx must be greeted
with seamlessly functioning communications and transportation infrastructure, comfortable and plentiful accommodation! ample food and
water, clean enough air a~d streets, a courteous and able service population, and a level of public order that is effective without being threatening to tourists! some of whom may have more than sports on their
minds-all under the acute observation of foreign journalists.
Since 2001 herds of bulldozers, cranes,and scaffolds have chewed up
huge swathes of the city in order to raise hundreds of multi story buildings generated by Olympic planning. New maps of the city have been
issued every three months (Harris 2006). By 2008 there will be a total
of 800 hotels with 130,000 rooms compared to 458 hotels with 84,812
rooms in 2005 (Owen 2005, 13-14). Thirty-one sports venues are mandated for Beijing and six more for the host cities of Qingdao! Hong
Kong, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenyan, and Qinhuangdao. Sixteen of these
will be completely new; all but three will be upgraded. Some $3.6 bil.
lion is earmarked to crisscross Beijing with fiber optic cable for infor.
mation and telecommunications infrastructure. Olympic Green, the
main venue of the Games, will have full access to broadband, Wi-Fi,
and networking technology (Ness 2002).
Beijing has undertaken dramatic new transportation initiatives. Existing satellite airports have been renovated. A new $1.9 billion terminal designed by Norman Foster in the shape of a flying dragon, the
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totem animal of Beijing, will make Tianjin International Airport the
world's largest at a million square meters. Three new ring roads have
been built along with new interurban rail links to surrounding cities.
On tap for 2008 are 1,000 kilometers of new highways and 84 kilometers of new train lines (Harris 2006). Eight new subway lines will stretch
across the city, including two special lines connecting the airport with
Olympic Green. Beijing's original two lines have been renovated for automated ticketing.
Olympic construction has made a significant contribution to
China's double~digit economic growth. In 2004 the Economist reported
that national spending on construction was 16 percent of GDP, growing
8 to 9 percent annually, just behind America and Japan. China consumes more than half the world's cement production, a bit more than
a third of its steel, a bit less than a third of its coal. It is second only to
the United States in consuming wood and petroleum. It builds an average 2 billion square meters of floor space annually, roughly half the
world's total. Twenty to thirty billion more are planned by 2015 Oakes

1,000 cubic meter international benchmark (Xinhua 2006c). The city's
current maximum daily consumption of 2.42 ,million cubic meters will
swell to 2.7 million during the Games. To meet this demand the municipal government plans to divert 400 million additional cubic meters
from reservoirs in neighboring agricultural provinces. This is a point of
regional contention since these areas also suffer from water shortages
as a result of drought, population increase, and industrial overuse
(Hornby 2006).
Organizers have vowed to make Beijing's air as clean as Paris's by the
beginning of the Games. Such an achievement seems unlikely. Prosperity, geography, and coal make Beijing one of the most polluted cities in
the world. Lung-damaging nitrogen dioxide and sulfur emissions spew
from a disproportionate number of coal-burning power plants and factories across China, much of which ends up in the north, where Beijing
is (Sheridan 2006). Fierce dust storms from the Gobi Desert blow into
the city, blinding traffic and delaying flights. Three and a halfmillIon
cars are expected to clog city streets by 2008. A pall of dust from 24 w
hours-a-day, year-in and year-out construction hovers over the city.
Not only residents and tourists are at risk, but alarmingly, marathoners
who will run along streets where particulate levels exceed U.S. safety
standards three and four times (Li 2006; Watts 2005). To scrub the air,
Beijing has invested $5.4 billion (Owen 200Si Ness 2002). More than
100 of the worstwpolluting textile,- pharmaceutical and chemical factories have relocated beyond the city, among them two major polluters,
the CapItal Iron & Steel group and the Chemical Industry Area (Xinhua
2006b). Other factories and construction sites will halt work or follow
reduced schedules weeks before the Games. Furnaces of less than 20
tons, including a number of home furnaces! are being converted to
clean fuels. In addition to imposing new emission standards on automobiles, 90 percent of the city's 20,000-odd public buses and 70 percent of its 67,000 taxis will convert to natural gas (Xinhua 2006b). During 'the Games clouds will be seeded to induce rain, and roads sprayed
daily to dampen down particulate matter. The planned installation of
8,00Q public toilets for the Games (USA Commercial Service 2004) will
require 4,700 new restrooms and the demolition of 2!800 hutong-alley
pUblic toilets (Marquand 2004). Four hundred miles of sewage pipes
will be renovated or added to city streets (Watts 2006) to treat 90 percent of Beijing's sewage in modern plants by 2010, compared to 60 percent in 2002 (Ness 2002).

2006).

In 2006 Beijing hosted an Olympic dress rehearsal in which thirtyfive leaders of developing natioris came to the China-Africa Forum
while 810,000 police, public officials, and retired party members directed traffic and kept public order. Out of town vehicles were bannedi
government workers stowed their car keys and walked or biked to work.
When an IOC inspection team visited Beijing in 1993, police sweeps removed street children, the unemployed, beggars, and street vendors
from view (Broudehoux 2004, 198). Similar measures to cosmeticize
public space are doubtless in place for the 2008 Games. In 2006
officials were forced to deny rumors that a million· migrant laborers
would be expelled from the capital before the Games, and the mentally
ill confined to hospitals (Economist. com 2006). Public plans to create
frictionless space for visitors include selective traffic bans, sending
workers _away from the city on well-timed vacations, and energetic
campaigns against spitting, smoking, line-jumping, and foul language.
Classes to teach tourist-friendly English to police, taxi drivers, and ordinary citizens are in full swing (Marquand 2004).
Less publicly visible, but logistically critical, are adequate :water sup~
plies for Olympic visitors, hotels, and the new greenbelts springing up
all around the city. Deep in a seven-year drought, Beijing's average per
capita water availability is 300 cubic meters annually, far below the
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Olympic Space

ter the r989 democracy protest~ made' the regime wary of draWing
people to Tiananmen Squar,e. While interest in stimulating an active
arts culture or creating a distinguished modern cityscape like that of
long-time rival Shanghai was slow in coming to this city of ceremonial
and administrative tradition, the rivalry with Shanghai ultimately
moved the project forward. After Shanghai renovated its centrally located People's Square in the 1990S, adding the Urban Exhibition Hall,
the National Museum/ and the Grand Theater to general architectural
and urban planning acclaim, the National Grand Theater was reimag~
ined as a prestigious Beijing icon able to stand tall next to both Shang~
hars Gran,d Theater, an elegant modernist structure by the French architectJean~Marie Charpentier, and the Sydney Opera House/ a galling
reminder of Beijing/s failed 2000 Olympic bid.
The National Theater was designated as the most important cultural
project in the roth Five·Year Plan. Because of, or in spite of/ this facti
five rounds of domestic competition failed to produce a design accept·
able to the State Council. International architects were solicited and, after a hasty show of public consultation, the Council settled on Paul Andreu, designer of the Pudong International Airport and the innovative
Charles de Gaulle Airport (Volume 5 n.d.). Andreu had also been the
finishing architect for the Grande Arche in Paris following the death
of Johann Otto von Spreckelsen, its original architect. Modern and
gracefully monumental, the arch is an homage to the nearby Arc de
Triomphe. If the Chinese had hoped for something as historically sensitive/ this was not what they got. Andreu/s selection, Widely reported
abroad, was not announced at home for nearly a year. This was apparently to avoid embarrassing the fiftieth anniversary celebration of the
founding of the PRe with the news that after forty years of delibera·
tion, a Westerner had been chosen to erect a resolutely futurist landmark in hallowed Chinese national space. 3
When the plan for the giant glass and titanium egg and artificial lake
finally surfaced, forty-nine members of the Chinese Academy of Sci~
ence and Academy of Engineering petitioned Jiang Zemin demanding
a r_e'versal. They were followed by r09 Chinese architects denouncing
its aggressively avant-garde appearance and lIillogicaJl' interior (China
Daily 2004). Critics charged that the $536 million cost-more than the
Sydney Opera House, four times the Lincoln Center in a country with
one quarter the GDP of the United States-would raise ticket prices to
a level only the most prlvlleged could afford (China Youth Daily 2004).
Also ofconcern was the symbolism (and maintenance costs) of a large

Nearly half of Beijing/s competition venues are sited on Olympic
Green, the purpose-built 2,800-acre park where the major festival
venues will be located. The Green sprawls in a rough T-shape across the
fourth and fifth ring roads in Chaoyang district. Additional venues are
spread out among eight universities in the Haidan district of northwest
Beijing; the so-called Northern'Scenic Area of Shunyi district and the
Ming dynasty tombs; and the Western Community area in Shijingshan
district. The dominant Western aesthetics of these spectacular structures with which the Chinese mean to present themselves to the world
has sparked a contentious civic debate. The most passionate controversies involve the National Grand Theater, which occupies politically
charged real estate just off Tiananmen Square, and the new China Central Television (CCTV) headquarters that will launch its new institutional home by broadcasting the Games from start to finish. Though
neither building is officially an Olympic venue, both occupy a prominent role in the campaign to display a glamorous urban face to international visitors. The National Grand Theater is intended to showcase
the high culture of Beijing, and the close association of CCTV with the
Games signals the regime/s focus on China/s image for the duration.

The National Grand Theater
The National Grand Theater is a giant silver ellipsoid dome set on an
artificial square pool and entered through an underwater tunnel. As
Beijing/s preeminent performance venue, it will be home to a 2,416-seat
opera house/ a 2,oI7-seat concert hall and a r,040.;.seat theater. At night ~
its semitransparent skin will offer a glimpse of the performances within
it, staging a very public spectacle for passersby (RjOII 2006). The theater
stands just off Chang An Avenue, west of the Great Hall of the People
in Tiananmen Square. It is a dramatic stylistic departure from the sacred architectural legacy next to it.
The theater began as Zhou Enlai's dream of completing Mao Zedong's legacy of Ten' Great Buildings a"round Tiananmen Square. Diverting economic resources to build it Was politically out of the question during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
Subsequent Party infighting about what kind of monument was most
suitable for the space caused more delay/ a debate that grew sharper af-
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pool in a city of scarce water resources. Official descriptions of the de~
sign-sparkling drop of water, silver tear, pearl and eggshell-did battle
with popular Insults: theater as alien egg, big tomb, boiled egg, French
opera house, flying saucer. Xiao Mo, an architectural historian from
Tsinghua University, memorably charged that the red desert dust constantly blowing through Beijing would give the dome the look of
"dr1ed dung tl (Kahn 2004). In an unprecedented move, even the statesponsored China Daily sided with the project's opponents. Several con~
struction halts and the unrelated collapse of an Andreu-designed terminal at Charles de Gaulle finally provided face-saving safety reasons
to scale back the project and trim its cost by $200 million.
Despite its avant-garde style, the theater does gesture strategically to
tradition. Building and lake together evoke the square earth and round
heaven of ancient Chinese cosmology. An earth~red masonry wall at
the theater entrance echoes the color of the walls of the Forbidden City.
The 46-meter height of the building exactly matches the elevation of
the nearby Hall of the People! thus respectfully obserVing the ancient
imperial taboo forbidding any structure to stand taller than the footrest
of the Emperor's Throne.

right angles into horizontal connectors at top and bottom to form a
continuous Mobius-strip loop. The architect has mischievously suggested that the irregular patterning visible on the structure!s face traces
the forces traveling through it. This, says a reviewer! .

ceTV
In imperial China the only exceptions to this taboo were the royal Bell
and Drum Towers! visible at every point as the tallest structures i,;n the
ancient city. From these public monuments issued the loudest communal noise as well, clanging and beating as the city gates were locked
each night and unlocked at dawn. In a society where commoners were
forbidden to behold their rulers, imperial power daily penetrated domestic life by imposing dominion over space and time. Something of
this ancient role is reprised by a new skyline topper, the 750 foot (230
meter) headquarters of the CCTV broadcasting system, ceaselessly
beaming the presence' of the twenty-first century state into domestic
space. Though not the tallest structure in Beijing, it is by any cultural
measure the loudest. Designed by Rem Koolhaas for the Office of Met~
ropolitan Architecture, the trapezoidal square~looped building occu~
pies its own Io~hectare site at the heart of a new Central Business Dis~
trict east of the Forbidden City. The first of 300 planned towers
planned for the CBD, the CCTV IITwisted Donut" consists of two vertical sections leaning toward one another at 6o~degree angles and.bent at

raises the question of Why a Chinese media conglomerate would want
to express the structural forces of its building. The juxtaposition of the
fully glazed, hence transparent! bUilding surface with an irregular grid
would seem to symbolically reveal the hidden institutional power
struggle in a large state~owned organization. It is safe to assume that
the Chinese authorities do not interpret this symbolism as a general
, cry for independent journalism! otherWise the project would not have
received the green light. (Horsley n.d.)
With a straight face Koolhaas also argues that his colossal edifice does
not point to the sky and so is not a skyscraper but an "earthbound
structuret! (Leonard 2004). Regardless, it houses the complete appara~
tus of the state system-administration, news, broadcasting, program
production, and studios. More than IO,OOO employees will circuiate
through the continuously communicating, self-contained site complete with its own hotel, shopping, and parking facili,ties.
Critics have been harsh. Ian Buruma (2002) has deplored the un~
seemly tussle among Western "starchitects lt fot the privilege of erecting
a temple to state information control:
There is nothing reprehensible about building an opera house in Beijing, or indeed a hotel, a hospital, a university or even a corporate
headquarters. But state television is something else. CCTV is the voice
of the party, the centre of state propaganda, the organ which tells a billion people what to think.
Having warmed up, Buruma piles on the criticism:
[I]t is true that architects are often drawn to power. Le Corbusier tried
_to interest the Vichy regime and Stalin in his projects. Philip Johnson
was a bit of an amateur black~shirt. Before leaVing Germany, Walter
Gropius and Mies van der Rohe were too close to the Nazis. One can
see Why. To build on a grand scale you need authority and a lot of
money. And architects with a utopian bent, who dream of transform~
ing not just skylines but the way we live, are natural suckers for totali~
tarianism.And, indeed, suckers for capitalist excess.
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In- a similar vein Spanish critic, Luis Fernandez-Galiano (2003) writes
that the tower conveys "the communicatory ambition of China's totalitarian capitalism and its determination to adapt to the symbolic codes
of western economies." Koolhaas's response is that the final answer on
China's future is not in. Offering his own communicative take on the
tower, he likens its appearance to that other imperial message medium
of choice, ancient calligraphy (Leonard 2004).
Nor has the tower escaped criticism for its $750 million price tag. Wu
Liangyong, cofounder of the architecture department at Tsinghua University and a director of early feasibility studies for a number of
Olympic venues, publicly deplored the tower's original $5 billion yuan
($603 million) estimate as outrageously extravagant, writing: "I'm not
against novel ideas, or unconventional or unorthodox designs, as that
is what the art needs ... But we cannot put aside engineering and structure, we, cannot overlook our culture, or the cost. China is not rich
enough not to care about 5 billion yuan" (People's Daily Online 2004).
The pa,rtly completed tower has been the focus of grassroots dissent
as well. The demolition of a nail house standing in the way of site construction in April 2007 became an emblematic story of local resistance
to the·tower in particular and the ruthless pace of urban redevelopment
in China generally (Reuters 2007). In China a "nail" is a stubborn
troublemaker who refuses to be flattened. A nail house is the last house
left standing on a tract marked for demolition because its owners refuse
compensation from developers and hold out against eviction orders by
the courts. Several nail houses across China have brought national and
international publicity to street protests, several suicides, and other
desperate efforts by local residents with few legal remedies and no say
in the fate of their homes and neighborhoods in spite of energetic efforts by the regime to block press coverage.

Games, and there is reason to believe it will differ in important details
from the layout presented in the winning master plan by Sasaki Landscape Architects of Boston. Three parcels comprise the Green. Northernmost is Forest Park} a squarish 1,680-acre plot three times the size of
Manhattan's Central Park but likewise tntended to reduce urban heat
and noise with vast expanses of green. The abutting second parcel, the
1,ooo-acre(405 hectare) Central Area drops vertically toward the
fourth ring road along the imperial spine of old Beijing. Here are
celebrity venues for the major athletic contests and ceremonies, and
open areas for containing Olympic crowds. To the south and east of the
({entral Area is the third parcel, the site and stadium complex of the
1990 Asian Games, the first mega sporting event in China. More modestly sized than Forest Park, this parcel is formally integrated by an axis
running northwest from the Asian Games stadium through the Central
Area.
The entire Green is tethered by a seventeen-mile (twenty-four km)
path that extends the north-south boulevard running through the
Central Area of the Green to the north gate of the Imperial City and be~
yond to the enormous new train station connecting Beijing to the rest
of China. The design, which features tree's and grand esplanades, is the
work of Albert Speer, Jr., and has been compared to the axis envisioned
for Adolf Hitler's BerlIn by Speer's father. Speer demurs, calling his
boulevard "a philosophical and religious axis.... We transformed the
Chinese character zhong, which means middle, into an axis surrounded
by an ecological garden" (Bernstein 2003). He adds, "This is not an axis
representing power. It's an axis that looks back to two and a half thou~
sand years of Chinese history." Maybe. But zhong.invokes Zhongguo, the
name of the kingdom that claimed as its rightful domain "all under
heaven, /} which meant, roughlYI the center of the civilized world for
most of those two and a half millennia. No Chinese citizen would miss
the allusion.

Olympic Green Venues
Set down in the heart of the city, both the National Grand Theater and
the CCTV tower proVide highly visible targets for vig~rous civic debate
around officially "conceived" and vernacularly "lived" space. By contrast, Olympic Green has been largely shielded from public view by the
high -construction fence that surrounds the site, The final look of the
Green will remain something of a mystery until the opening of the
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dium is the biggest commission ever undertaken by Jacques Herzog and
Pierre de Meuron, of Tate Modern and de Young Museum fame, who
have aspired to make it "the most visible icon in contemporary China."
Their original structure was a daring structural response to the problem
of concealing the retractable allwweather roof insisted on by the Chi:nese. Its solution was an arrangement of mutually supporting curved
steel rods crisscrossing in apparently random fashion to create a huge
basketlike structure that appears visually Weightless. In the words of the
competition document (Bejing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning n.d.):
The stadium is conceived as a large collective vessel, which makes a distinctive and unmistakable impression both when it is seen from a
distance and from close up. It meets all the functional and technical requirements of an Olympic National Stadium, but without communicating the insistent sameness of technocratic architecture dominated
by large spans and digital screens. The spatial effect of the stadium is
novel and radical and yet simple and of an almost archaic immediacy.

The stadium is selfwconsciously green/ housing a natural air ventilation system central to its much-trumpeted sustainable design (Rjorr
2006). A spaCiOUS ambulatory between the outer structure and the interior bowl contains a hotel, a shopping mall, and public areas meant to
be open at all times. "What we think is the strength of this project is the
space in between, the concourse, which is to be filled with life in a conw
tinuous pageant. Even in Beijing's sometimes harsh climate} observes de
Meuron, lithe people use ... public space-to dance, to play cards ll
(Lubow 2006), a prescient nod to the motivating nonpolitical atmosphere of Olympic Green that appears to be its larger national purpose.
Water Cube
n

Ac'ross from the Stadium is the other celebrity building on the Green.
The $100 million 7.B-acre National Aquatic Swimming Centre by the
Australian firm PTK has been nicknamed the IIWater Cube ll for its ,blue
skin of irregularly patterned water bubbles. With a floor space of 70/000
square metersl it contains five pools; has room for 17,000 spectators;
and will host swimming diving, synchronized swimming/ and waterpolo finals. Its rectangular frame is a net'''''ork of slender steel pipes
linked by 121000 load-bearing nodes that distribute the building's
weight. Filling in the exterior cell-like geometry that articulates its
shimmering skin are 100,000 square meters of a Teflon-like membrane
eight one-thousandths of an inch thick that are state of the art in
strength and energy efficiency. The architects claim these panels will let
in more light and heat than glass while slashing total energy costs by 30
percent and daytime lighting costs by half (Xinhua 2oo6b). Green engineering also extends to the reuse of double-filtered, backwashed pool
water/ and rainwater collected in subterranean tanks to fill the pools.
The architects have taken pains to impose meaning on form by pub w
licly linking the pipe and node structural geometry to natural systems
like crystals and molecules. They point to water a~ an ancient symbol
of tranquility and happiness and connect the bubblelike clusters of the
ol}ter skin to the circular heavens and the shape of the building to the
square earth of ancient Chinese universe.
l

At the same time the gray outside/ red inside color scheme paid tribute
to Chinese building tradition by repeating the color scheme of an archetypal Beijing courtyard. The roof that occasioned the original design problem was eventually discarded, partly in response to a report by
the Chinese Academies of Science critical of the stadium1s lIoutIandish
visual effects" and questioning its seismic safety, and partly to an across
the board cost-cutting order imposed on all Olympic-related construction in 2004 (Marquand 2004).4 The look of the stadium improved, a
number of construction and maintenance headaches were eliminated,
and $37 to $40 million was saved.
Hoping to kickwstart the popular naming tradition that is a sign of
beloved Chinese buildings/ the architects strategically compared the
look of the stadium to the crackled glaze of a ceramic vase and the lattices in a Ming window in their original proposaL What caught the
judges/ fancy/ however, was the Swiss team's casually offered analogy of
the steel rods to the delicate tWigs of a bird's nest/ and the plastic mem w
branes stuffing the openings to the grass and leaves that pack a nest. Instantly, the stadium became the Bird's.Nest, auspiciously conjuring up
the edible nest of the cave swift, the main ingredient of a prized Chinese delicacy associated with ritual feasting.
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Discontent a~d Disgruntlement
Embedded bows to traditional cosmology aside the assertive Western
look and feel of the most visible Olympic structures has been a continl
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uing source of civic grumbling. Forced to accept the program of the
Games as a showcase of Occidental sport, dependent on Western media
to frame the festival for much of the global audience, many Chinese expected that the major landmarks of Olympic built form, visual stage
sets for media images of the Games, would certify their Chinese! or at
least Asian, character. Instead, a celebrity stable of foreign superstars
has made embarrassingly apparent the lack of a distinctive Chinese interpretation of modern architecture for the country's coming out party
in its emblematic new national space.
There are certainly enthusiasts, many young and hip, who have embraced the cultural mixing of China and the West (Becker 2004). The
syrupy official line puts the best face on it. In stilted English, the
People's Daily calls Olympic Green lithe cream of urban architectural
construction and urban planning of Beijing in the history of architectural art at all times in all countries." Describing a promotional
marathon race from the Forbidden City to the National Stadium
(doubtless meant to stir local enthusiasm and downplay poor air quality), it continues: "One is Oriental and the other Occidental! wholly
modern. It is another integration of ancient oriental culture with modern Olympic Games sports and a spectacular scene of harmony of Chinese with Western cultures" (People!s Daily 200r).
Forests of gleaming skyscrapers designed by Western architects seem
to reprise on a grand scale the multistory buildings erected by Western
legations at the end of the nineteenth century. In the next century the
New Culture Movement embraced Western modernism as the model
for reconstructing Chinese society on the ruins of dynastic tradition.
Then! too, Western adventurers stood ready to exploit the transition
(Dong 2003, 30-3I). Today China is lithe largest construction site inthe
worId for Western architects in search of new frontiers. As Business
Week (Bell 2007) puts it:

new Western-style building as a loss of Chinese identity, It does not
help that substandard building quality and aesthetic banality have often come along for the ride. "On the one hand,'you have these tW9
projects-CCTV, which could only be built in China, and the stadium!1I
Pierre de Meuron has written, "and you have on the other hand thousands of uninteresting projects, like mushrooms" (quoted in Lubow
2006).
Architectural critic Deyan Sudjic (2005) echoes themes Widely
voiced in and outside China: /lCars move around disconnected clumps
of newly completed towers," and lIentire new districts appear arbitrarily as if from nowhere." He adds:
A city that, until 1990, had no central business district, and little need
of it, now has a cluster of glass towers that look like rejects from Singa~
pore or Rotterdam. And these, in turn, are now being replaced and
overshadowed by a new crop of taller, slicker towers, "the product of
the international caravan of architectural gunslingers that has arrived
in town to take part in this construction free-fire zone,"

Absent a prominent coterie of Chinese architects to steer the building
boom that followed the Deng reforms, many observers regard every

Chinese intellectuals, activists, and architectural professionals have not
been hesitant to broadcast similar conclusions. As early as 1999 Wu
Liangyong used the annual congress of the Union of International Architects to d~nounce Western theories of architecture as inapplicable to
China's changing and complex environment (Li 2000). Wu called for
developing countries to explore their own paths "according to their
conditions, rather than copying models of industrialized nations,"
liThe foreign moon is not always better than the moon in China," sec~
onds Ma Guoxin, chief architect for the Beijing Architectural Design
Institute (Gluckman 2001),
Returning to Beijing after a year in Europe, journalist Lin Gu described his feeling of disorientation. "This city is increasingly unrecognizable, and it feels alien, all this avant-garde architecture/' he writes.
"Many people in Beijing have been brainwashed to think big build~
ings-however ugly-are modern" (Gluckman 2004). 'I/Overstatement' is now the main approach in design, bold form the main character," writes architect Li Xiaodong (2000, 402). Feng Jicai, an activist
working to save the slender remnants of republican Beijing, observes,
/lIn the I960s and 70S, we destroyed our culture angrily. In the 1980s to
now! we're destroying our culture happily" (Meyer 2003). Looking back
on a century of unthinking modernization lately kicked into high gear!
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Beijing, in particular, is a city of eggs awaiting a clutch of architer::tural
omelettes, with whole districts razed for redevelopment. And why not?
From a western perspective, China represents a colossal opportunity,
the physical manifestation of architectural ideas that, until now, had
only found their expression in elaborate computer-generated imagery
or in small, bespoke projects.
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Kongjian Yu, founder and dean of the Graduate School of Landscape
Architecture at Beijing University, and a principal of the first private
landscape design firm in China, ventures this pessimistic diagnosis

consequence that China's ancient building traditions had persisted
nearly unchanged up to the fall of the Qing. In the wake of that collapse, energies long compressed by imperial enclosure were suddenly
drawn out into newly revealed spaces animated by nationalist enthusi~
asm (Dong 2003, 82). Partly in response to the public park movement·
gathering steam in Japan and the West, imperial gardens, 'hunting
grounds, and ceremonial sites were opened to vibrant experiments in
public life and politics including mass rallies organized by republican
activists to express their democratic aspirations (Padua 2006, 33). In
time the T~shaped intersection in front of Tiananmen gate became so
associated with nationalist and antigovernment -protest that Tianan~
men Gate was the only conceivable place from which Mao, standing
atqp it, could declare the birth of the People's Republic. Here, too, the
lingering imperial association was propitious since the Chinese characters for Tiananmen may be rendered as "receiving the mandate from
Heaven and stabiliZing the kingdom."
As it turned out, Mao wielded architecture as ruthlessly as any emperor. His monumentally expanded Tiananmen Square was larger than
either Moscow's Red Square or Mexico City's Zocal6, a vast revolutionary plain without walls or gates, the traditional markers of Chinese cosmological and social order. Though Tiananmen visibly rebuked the
dosed power of the ForbIdden City, Mao shamelessly traded on its
deeply embedded psychological authority by annexIng the square as a
kind of giant imperial forecourt. Every architectural- gesture associated
with Tiananmen was carefully calculated, beginning with the widening
of Chang An Avenue into a major traffic artery. Slashing through the
ancient inviolable north-south axis, the boulevard severed the walled
city from the socialist square, signaling the triumph of socialism over
the past and creating a grand promenade for displays of socialist military power. Even before the founding of the PRC, Mao had dreamed of
a Monument to the People's Heroes at the center of Tiananmen. Its
chief designer wrote', "We ... recognized that the axis of the present
Square is no longer the past Imperial Path. The importance of the Mon~
mp.ent will be most effectively accentuated by this central position"
(Wu H. 2005, 25). To a later critic the Monument constituted "a revolutionary-proletarian obscenity in the middle of the sacred way" (Leys
"977, 54)·
Clearing a fifty-acre open space at the dense heart of a traditional urban patchwork of endlessly articulated walls within walls was no small
undertaking. Ancient city ramparts and blocks of tiled-roof courtyard

(LAND Online 2006):

[Olur cities are now becoming the same. Why? Because we neglected
the natural environment, we neglected the cultural heritage, and we
destroyed too much. We destroyed the everyday living structures, even
people's houses. Things have not been designated as historical sites,
and they are all gone; they have all been destroyed. Millions of square
meters have been destroyed in every city. And it is the natural land~
scape and the cultural heritage that make a city different from others.
So, when we wiped out all of this cultural heritage and these vernacu~
lar landscapes, and when we didn't respect the natural landforms, the
natural water systems, the natural vegetation, the whole city became
man-made with no meaning or form. Sometimes it looks like you've
just dumped an American city in the middle of China.
The dilemma of a culture that cannot return to the past but has not
seized its own architectural path to the future is captured by L M. Pei,
who has sought to establish a Chinese interpretation of modern architecture informed by its own tradition:
Chinese architecture is at a dead end, totally. There is no way for them
to go. Chinese architects will agree with me on that. , , The days of the
temples and the palaces are not only economically out of reach but ide~
ologica.l1y unacceptable to them. They've tried the Russian way, and
they hate those buildings, They are trying to take the Western way. I
am afraid that will be equally unacceptable. (Li 2000, 393)
I'n the 1980s Pei, who was born in China, championed a "new vernacularism" featuring the modest white walls and gray tiles of traditional demotic style. Admired by many academics and intellectuals, itnonetheless proved too nostalgic, too delicate, and too technologically backward
to prevail against the ambitions of China's modern developers.

Mao's Ghost
China's lack of an identifiable modern architecture goes back, as so
much does, to the trauma of the Cultural Revolution. Nor is it of small
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houses that had formed the city's elegant aesthetic since the Ming dyw
nasty were leveled. To celebrate the PRC's first decade, Ten Great Buildings devoted to government and commemorative purposes went up
during a ten-month, twenty-four-hourwawday building' frenzy around
the borders of Tiananmen and along Chang An Avenue. Their severe
SovJet monumentalism implemented with technical help from
Moscow was another break with traditional form (though not a,com w
plete one-the symmetry, horizontality, and serial columns of socialist
neoclassicism recall features of traditional Chinese style) and trumpeted a new antifeudal aesthetic. Their stolid gaze framed the spectacles of mass assent that came to be the legitimizing ritual of twentieth
century state power.
During the Cultural Revolution, architects suspected of bourgeois
tendencies were unable to publish or get approval for their designs. Access to all foreign architectural texts was strictly forbidden, and training programs started in the republican era were shut down. Not a single architect was trained for a decade. Many that had been working
were sent to the countryside, factories, and the army for reeducation
(Uu 20003, 45). Beijing's growth was brought to a haItI the better to revitalize the countryside as the privileged space of social renewal. By
such means the sustained and patient cultivation necessary to the evolution of any architectural art was deliberately destroyed, another casu w
alty of the Cultural Revolution.
When Deng Xiaoping's Four Great Modernizations shifted resources
back to the cities there were, therefore, few practitioners to implement
the new program of office complexes, hotels, and skyscrapers (Bezlova
2003). Visiting Western architects and the creation of training opportunities abroad for Chinese architectural students were called on to fill
the gap as the profession struggled to reconstitute itself. Aspiring Chinese designers looked to Western postmodern styles with little under~
standing of their ironist mannerism. The result was a hybrid kitsch of
decorative Western-style detail appliqued on SOViet-style grandiosity.s
Recoiling from this incoherent mimeticism, the mayor of Beijing
briefly required every new tower block to sport a Chinese-style pagoda
roof, which were popularly labeled "watermelon rinds."
The 1989 democracy protests marked still another turning point in
the regime's relation to space. By effectively seizing Tiananmen Square
the June Fourth Protesters challenged state power at its physical and
symbolic core. Refusing to play the acquiescent and submissive role demanded of Chinese citizens, they dared the state to reclaim its own
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space. It did so with a horrific display of force in the surrounding streets
that deeply damaged its standing at home and abroad. Defined for centuries by their unquestioned control of space, China's rulers found that
monumental space was no longer sacrosanct in a television age, but politically ambiguous and highly vulnerable.

Olympic Green as a Successor to Tiananmen
This brings us to Olympic Green as a monumental successor, or perhaps an antidote, to Tiananmen Square. According to the Confucian
uriderstanding that what is superior is northernmost to what is inferior,
the,-.Green's northern extension of the fourteenth century imperial axis
of earthly and cosmic,order "leads" it to completion in the twenty-first.
There is also talk of the Green as a I'second capital" to relieve pressure
on the dense, untidy jumble of central Beijing (People's Daily 200!). If
the Green is the new living room of the people, Tiananmen Square
looks more like the relic of a completed phase of Chinese history. Without overtly rejecting Mao, such a shift at least dislodges him. The gesture is infinitely more subtle than Tiananmen's drastic refocus of public representation away from the Forbidden City.
Open and unwalled Tiananmen was an epochally new kind of Chi w
nese political space where masses of citizens could gather as the corporate body of the nation to affirm the socialist state. In an extraordinary
departure, Forest Park and the Central Area are officially imagined as
glitzy leisure spaces for public pleasures. The official vision of postOlympic commercial, exhibi'tion, sports, and entertainment spaces on
the Green and elsewhere paints a civic portrait of obedient consumers
attuned more to immediate gratification than politics. In Lefebvrian
terms the Green is a wholly new conceived space! a cagey gamble by a
new generation of rulers who are betting that stripping national space
of overt political content will diffuse its potential for I'lived" protest.
They are likely encouraged by nearly two decades of public response to
com.mercial malls and nighttime strips (WU H. 2005, 22).
In imperial China the boisterous and varied street life of commoners
was crowded into festivals and markets conducted in the narrow hutongs, between traditional siheyuan walls. Cathedrals, stadia, open
squares, and other public gathering spaces familiar to the West were
unknown since the only great open spaces were royal playgrounds.
Lesser parks, temple and monastic gardens, and private scholar gardens
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were reserved for the gentry. Mary Padua (2006, 31) finds key elements
of classical Chinese garden style in the scholar's garden:

Lake and have migrated to the southern half of the park below the fifth
ring road where they are said to display the art of the contemporary
Chinese garden. The landscaped layers of classical mythology have disappeared. There is not a mention of thousand-year plazas. It appears
that any whiff of feudal traditionalism has been decisively rejected for
a resolutely depthless modernism.
In its simplified surfaces the apparent evolution of Forest Park away
from the co~plexity of the Sasaki master plan also speaks to the expe~
riences of a number of Western architects. Their tale is an opposite iteration of that told by Chinese architects about the flow of design contracts to their better organized, more glamorous Western counterparts.
In- this alternate tale, Western designers are lavishly courted and pursued by Chinese developers anxious to dangle Western experience and
exposure before skeptical investors. Once a design is awarded) however,
government overseers have the power to demand severe cost cutbacks
if money gets tight. Already working} they claim, for 20 to 30 percent
of what they could expect to charge outside China (Gluckman 2001),
Western designers of record have found themselves forced aside in favor of their less pricey Chinese partners, with whom all foreign designers are paired by law, who are quick to discard Western-co"ntributed aspects of an original design for less costly alternatives. Facing
corruption, construction delays, and endless bureaucratic meddling,
many Western architects have been unable to break even (Lubow
2006). Sasaki principal ,DennisPieprz has commented, for example,
that the $68.7 million ceiling ultimately imposed on Forest Park was
too slender to justify the continued participation of his firm (author,
phone interview, December 28, 2006).

Private scholar gardens represented high culture and were designed for
and by the literati-in this case, retired government officials-as places
for contemplation. Garden design was influenced by Taoism and the
yin-yang principles of harmony, where the garden contained the
essence of the world with all things standing in proper relationship to
each other. Mountains (artificial rockery) represented yang, the active
stimulating force, while still water was intended to induce tranquility,
representing yin, the passive principle that stands for darkness and
mystery.
The winning master plan of Sasaki Associates for Forest Park alludes to
many of these features. Its three-dimensional representation of Kunlun
Mountain, a legendary axis mundi connecting Heaven and Earth and
the source of the four great rivers of China, references the mythical ori·
gin of Chinese civilization. The 277-acre (1,122 hectare) Dragon Lake
situated at the foot of the Sasaki Kunlun is in the shape of Ying Lung,
the Responding Dragon of water, wealth, and good luck in Chinese
lore, its long curving tail sweeping the length of the Central Area' below. A peach tree flower forest edging Dragon Lake symbolizes immortality and references the idyllic society created by Tong dynasty poet
Tao Qian, the cultural hero credited with inventing Chinese poetic tradition. Tao's wilderness cosmology corresponds with the emergence of
the landscape shan shui school of Chinese classical painting that may
have originated in poetic illustration. Tao Qian is associated with the
spiritual refinement of a broadly civilized life (Hinton 2002).6 Additional references to a grand conception of tradition in the Sasaski plan
depict the boulevard descending down the axial spine of the Central
Area as serially segmented into thousand-meter plazas, each celebrating the achievements of a millennium of Chinese history.
One looks in vain to the official Web site that tracks the construction
progress of the Green for any mention of all this. It briefly explains that
Forest Park is divided into north and south parcels by the fifth ring
road. It describes the northern portion as a forest of 800,000 newly
planted trees. The south is described as a sculpted landform of hills,
wetlands, meadows and upland forests of pine and deciduous trees.
The whole is touted as a model ecology of indigenously biodiverse
plants and animals in a sustainable natural habitat. But Kunlun Mountain and Dragon Lake have now become Main Mountain and Olympic
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Public Space as a Casualty Then and Now
Under Mao, Beijingers lived mostly in decentralized, self-sufficient
work unit enclaves to which they were legally tethered for housing,
employment, and essential social services. No large public space, mass
transportation system, or even a central business district was allowed to
disturb the close pattern of walled compounds that encompassed what
remained of the republican city. This inherited urban fabric, which has
been the sustained target of modernizing efforts since the beginning of
the twentieth century} has given way to industrialization, market reform, and growing demands for liVing space in the post-Mao period.
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Regime claims for the positive benefits of this transformation notwithstanding, the quality of travel within the city arid space for exercise,
play, and beauty have declined sharply for most citizens, swallowed up
by endless constellations of glass office towers and gated enclaves
whose scale broadcasts a lofty indifference to the texture of public life
and whose security personnel manifest contempt for ordinary citizens.
A once diverse urban texture has steadily mutated into an aesthetically
and socially homogenized cityscapeJ Neighborhoods in which extended families lived for centuries in close-knit community networks
have been lost. In 2005 the Geneva-based Centre on Housing Rights
and Evictions (COHRE) claimed to have verified 400,000 cases of
forcible relocations of city residents as far as 25 to 60 km (r6 to 37 miles)
from familiar communities and social networks (COHRE 2005).
While arguing for the necessity of bringing modern sanitation and
safe physical surroundings to acres of dilapidated neighborhoods,
official statistics concede that roughly 40 percent of the approximately
3,700 hutongs recorded in the r980s have now disappeared. In re~
sponse, critics like Richard Ingersoll (2003) have articulated a strong
oppositional rhetoric:

The district set aside for the "Olympic Green" will be no exception to
this program of agoraphobic vegetation, replacing urban fabric with
more easily maintained public spaces.

With the increased pace of development for the Olympic Games, the
tightly woven hutongs, narrow alleys that serve the single-story historic courtyard houses surrounding the core of the Forbidden City and
the Tian Tan temples, face imminent demolition or gentrification. The
former will eradicate the memory of architectural form, while the latter will undermine the local class mix that gives these neighborhoods
their Vitality ... Right next to the Forbidden City, for example ... bulldozers are demolishing everything in sight, scooping out a huge hole
in the ground for a multilevel shopping mall. When one realizes that
the tens of thousands of people who participated in the demonstrations that led to the 1989 massacre filtered through the ancient capillaries of the hutongs to fill Tiananmen Square, this form of urban lobotomy does not seem so casual.
The hutongs are the only places left in Beijing that have architectural
density and urban vitality. Otherwise, the cityscape-restructured during the past 20 years on a concentric web of ring roads, IO~lane highways, and hundreds of elevated interchanges-is dotted with countless
new 15- to 30-story condominiums and office towers. Intense landscaping succeeds to some extent in mitigating the disturbing lapses in
scale, style, and color of these new buildings. Armies of gardeners" it
seems, have groomed every intersection and highway viaduct.

The use of public funds to transform the deteriorating compounds of
the proletariat into leisure enclaves for the rich and the disintegration
of the lIurban public goods regime" remain contentious issues (Solinger
1995). In light of the government's modest compensation awards
(30,000 lawsuits were filed in protest to municipal authorities in 2004)
(Lin 2004), many citizens cannot afford the commodity estates that are
replacing their old compounds and have been forced to seek housing
on the periphery of the city. Critics argue that the privatization of the
,hOUSing market has created an income-segregated cityscape that has
further impoverished public life (Li and Yi 2007). Beyond the city, the
industrialization of agriculture and the denial of resources to rural areas
have driven nearly 200 million workers and peasants to cities such as
Beijing in search of jobs and better lives. These floating workers have
no access to state-subsidized goods, services, and opportunities available to legal residents and no entitlement to shelter or medical care.
Many lack adequate food. A large number have joined the construction
army of the building boom with its punishing working conditions and
lack of legal protections. What will happen when these jobs decline is
anyone's guess (Uu 2003, 46). Prostitution, homelessness, and petty
crime are rising along with tensions between city residents and migrant
workers.
Among those who have challenged the emergent spatial order of the
regime, some have strategically used it to express their dissatisfaction.
They include Zhang Dali, an artist from Harbin, an industrial city
northeast of Beijing. Lacking a Beijing danwei (work unit) or hukou (living permit), he and other ",floating" artists occupy an artists' colony
near the ruins of the Summer Palace gardens, burned to the ground
during the Boxer Rebellion and preserved as a testament to Western rapacity. Since 1995 Zhang has painted more than 2,000 images of his
balct profile on freeways, condemned buildings and crumbling walls in
the city (WU H. 2000). He writes, "I go on these walls to enter their life.

I open a dialogue with people. I assault them with the knowledge that
this city is changing. I don't care if you take part or don't take part, you
have to look at me" (Broudehoux 2004, 221). Though hundreds of city
workers erased his images in advance of celebrations for the handover
of Hong Kong in 1997, the government has not otherwise pursued him.
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His mode of public engagement has enlisted positive press coverage,
and admiring followers have marked new' buildings they deem particularly offensive (Broudehoux 2004, 220-25). It remains to be seen how
this Lefebvrian illived" space will be tolerated for the Olympics. /{De~
stroying Beijing," an artist's photograph from Zhang's IIDialogue SeM
ries," is here described byWu Hung:
It depicts a large stylized portrait of a man's head chiseled into a broken wall. However, there is a hole in the wall that allows the viewer to
peer through the man's head and see the Imperial Palace and the
Palace Museum in the distance....
The Imperial Palace is an obvious representation of tradition and the
broken wall represents modernity. Tradition, situated in the dimly
veiled distance, is in the process of being covered over-forgotten, but
in the course of the destruction of memory China must experience an
inchoate and broken modernity-broken and incomplete from its very
beginning ... We know that Chinese tradition will remain even after
the wall has been completed. But once the hole has been repaired, this
tradition. will be forever unseen and forgotten. (Zhao and Bell 2005,
49 8)

Conclusion
From the perspective of the regime, the mission of the 2008 Olympics
is to show an ambitious, confident China standing tall among the
world's advanced global powers. The stars of this outsized national mOM
ment are the grand and gaudy Olympic Green and its companion
spaces, which for sixteen days in August zo08 will offer a spectacular
visual backdrop for international attention. The newest model of the
national patrimony is a carefully designed space that lacks both an obvious center and an explicit political focus. Grand state ceremonies will
not take place here. The crowds that visit it will encounter super-sized
distractions: splendid architecture, forested groves, shopping, eating,
and elite sports spectatorship. The regime is banking on the scale of the
Green, which dwarfs Tiananmen, to render it impervious to political
appropriation. It is fortuitously segregated from ordinary communities
of work and politics. Its extravagant entertainments and tended landscapes have little to offer the poorest and most disenfranchised residents of Beijing, who mostly live at the southern edge of the city, from
which the Green is not readily accessible except by systems of transport
254

that lend themselves to state control should the need arise. The regime
nonetheless confronts a nascent civil society that has creatively used
resistance to the ongOing redevelopment of Beijing, on which the
Games have conferred urgency and purpose, to fashion vibrant new
networks of association and modes of discourse with a political coloring that may find other uses after the Games.
The message of the Green is that twentyMfirst century public life in
China is a colorful, bustling affair, a green escape, a frictionless territory
of upscale consumption and leisure. Its function is less to provide a setM
ting where citizens may gather freely than to assemble and display the
harmonious society idealized by the regime, in which consumption
equates with culture to trump history, and islands of imperial and republican nostalgia survive if they are pleasing to a domestic and inter~
national elite.
Unlike Tiananmen, the visual space of Olympic Green does not belong unquestionably to the state, but it does not quite belong to the
people, either. Like Tiananmen it is a triumphalist space that reposi~
tions authoritative public representation but speaks most clearly of
commodity consumption. It argues that a national vision of harmony
nestled within a regime of accumulation can overcome whatever problems arise from the forces that have created it. What Chinese citizens
will make of it all when the Games are done, and how to address the
growing tensions of postreform urban life gathering in the shadow of
Ozymandias, is a continuing story.
NOTES

See D. Bell 2007.
2. See, for example, Dong 2003 and Wu H. zoos.
3. Ironically, Andreu's design did address itself to high Chinese building
tradition with. bridges that prOVided a ceremonlal entry and simple spatial
and figural arrangements. See Liu 2003.
4. See also Hawthorne 2004.
5. This comment was attributed to Rem Koolhaas (2000), who, according
to Wolf (2000), informed "students, who spend years in school and then
more years in grueling apprenticeships, that, in China, 4o·story buildings are
designed on Macintoshes in less than a we~k. In the context of this hyperde M
velopment, the traditional architectural values-composition, aesthetics,
balance-are irrelevant." 2000.
6. See also Yang 2005,43-45.
7. An excellent discussion of China's changed residential landscape is Wu
F. 2005.
1.
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